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Summary:
•  A clear consensus has emerged among  
 Indonesia’s government, Muslim organizations,   
 and public opinion rejecting the Islamic State,  
 its agenda, and the brutality of its campaign to   
 establish an Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
•  Seeing the initial government response as  
 weak,Muslim organizations took the lead in   
 urging the government to prevent Indonesians   
 from traveling to Iraq and Syria to fight with   
 Islamic State, and to ban those currently there   
 from returning to Indonesia to avoid a repeat   
 of Indonesia’s experience with returning  
 “Afghan jihadis” through the 1990s and early   
 2000s – culminating in the 2002 Bali bombing.
•  President Joko Widodo has, since taking office  
 in October 2014, announced a number of steps  
 to prevent Islamic State ideology from taking  
 root in Indonesia, including travel bans to and  
 from Syria and Iraq, monitoring of Indonesians  
 living and traveling elsewhere in the Middle East, 
 and revision of Indonesia’s prison  
 deradicalization programs.
•  Steps in recent years to incorporate conservative  
 religious parties into the political mainstream   
 and the ensuing increase in public piety have   
 largely robbed advocates of Islamic State’s  
 radical agenda of a recruiting base and paved   
 the way for a strong, anti-Islamic State  
 consensus.
The anti-Islamic State Consensus
With local and international media continuing to 
report on the violence and brutality of ISIS  
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) – including killing 
both Muslims and non-Muslims and destroying 
Islamic historical sites including the tomb of the 
Prophet Jonah – Indonesian Muslims have rejected 
the call made by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader 
of ISIS, for Muslims to join the war to create an 
Islamic caliphate.
This rejection of IS spans government policy and 
the spontaneous response of individuals and,  
importantly includes a wide range of Muslim  
organisations. Indonesians have posted their  
anger and condemnation of acts of brutality on 
social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Banners 
and flyers posted in public spaces in villages and 
towns across Indonesia also repudiate Islamic State 
and its agenda: ‘Tolak ISIS – NKRI Harga Mati’ or 
‘Reject ISIS, The Unitary Republic of Indonesia is the 
price of death’, and, ‘NKRI YES, ISIS No’ or ‘Yes to 
the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, No to ISIS’.
While likely Government-sponsored, these banners 
send a clear message reminding Indonesians not to 
be deceived by Islamic State’s appeal for the  
creation of an Islamic caliphate. Indonesian  
authorities are playing the nationalism card,  
effectively arguing that support for IS will threaten 
national unity. Indonesian authorities have  
repeatedly warned that the ISIS agenda is not in 
line with Indonesia’s national Pancasila ideology 
and presents a threat to Indonesia’s cultural and 
religious diversity. (Berger 2014: Perdani and Ina,  
5 August 2014)
Muslim Civil Society Leads the Way
This unity between the state and key Muslim civil 
society organisations regarding the threat posed  
by Islamic State appears 
to have emerged only 
following the declaration 
of the caliphate in mid 
2014, and the release of 
a video of an Indonesian 
jihadi calling for fellow 
Indonesian Muslims to join ISIS. The Indonesian 
government was previously seen as being too soft.
As Berger (2014) put it, the Indonesian  
government showed little interest in responding to 
the threat ISIS posed to a peaceful Indonesian Islam 
during the first half of 2014. ISIS flags appeared 
among other Islamic religious symbols at pre- 
electionpublic rallies in the major street close to 
the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. Groups allegedly 
sympathetic to Islamic State organized a number  
of religious gatherings around Indonesia allegedly. 
For example, a group calling itself the Islamic Sharia 
Activists Forum (FAKSI) organised a public  
gathering to show support to ISIL at the Syarif 
Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) campus 
mosque in the outskirts of Jakarta. (Perdani, 
8 August 2014) The event triggered immediate 
public outcry when it was reported that this group 
used the event to take an oath and pledge loyalty 
to IS. (Trisna, 7 August 2014) The Muslim public 
opinion condemned athorities for allowing the 
event to take place at the State Islamic University, 
known as a center of moderate Islam, and  
demanded a crackdown on FAKSI. The State  
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Islamic University’s administration subsequently 
stated that it would not let the campus be used for 
radical teachings or the promulgation of IS  
ideology. (Perdani, 8 August 2014) Moderate  
Indonesian Muslims also questioned the 
government’s commitment to standing up against 
the spread of ISIL radical influence when the Police, 
under pressure from some Indonesian Islamits, 
laid charges of blasphemy against the Editor of 
the English Newspaper, the Jakarta Post, following 
publication of a cartoon depicting ISIS militants 
executing prisoners on 3 July 2014. The Islamists 
perceived the cartoon, which was intended to  
criticize Islamic State’s the use of Islamic symbols  
in the violent and brutal 
execution of IS prisoners, 
as insulting to Islam.
These incidents 
demonstrate that some 
Indonesian Islamists 
believe ISIS is fighting 
for a legitimate Islamic 
cause, and is, thus, 
worthy of support.  
Abu Bakar Baasyir, the 
former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah who is currently 
in prison for involvement in the Bali Bombings, has  
declared his allegiance to ISIS. The response  
to IS has been far from uniform, even among  
Indonesian Islamic radicals. Baasyir’s own group, 
JI, has split over his pledge to IS. One detrimental 
effect of this split within Islamist ranks is that he 
links and lines of communication between  
radicalized individuals/groups and potential Islamic 
State recruiters are likely to remain murky. This lack 
of clarity as to radical loyalties could actually  
complicate the law enforcement effort as  
compared to the response during the early 2000s.
The Government Response
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono condemned 
IS in August 2014, following the release of a video 
showing ISIL militants beheading US Reporter  
James Foley in August 2014, charging that what 
ISIL has done to Islam is an embarrassment. 
(France-Presse, 21 August 2014) At the same time, 
Commander of the Armed Forces, General  
Moeldoko announced that his office would work 
with the pesantren community to reintroduce  
pancasila into the pesantren curricula.  
(Berger 2014)
Indonesia’s new President, Joko Widodo, has taken 
more concrete action against ISIS campaigns to 
recruit Indonesians to join the conflict overseas. 
Upon coming to office in October 2014, President 
Widodo declared that his government will  
prevent Indonesians from travelling to Syria or Iraq. 
He has subsequently announced plans to monitor 
the movements of Indonesian citizens living in the 
Middle East and reinvent the prison deradicalisation 
program for convicted terrorists. Lastly, the  
government has expressed its commitment to 
working with traditional Islamic educational  
institutions – pesantren and madrasah – as well  
as religious leaders and Muslim organizations  
to promote a tolerant and moderate Islam.
The Indonesian government also recently  
announced that it will revoke the passports  
of Indonesians who have travelled to Syria and  
Iraq and prevent their return to Indonesia.  
(The Jakarta Post, 16 January 2015) Tedjo Edhy  
Purdjanto, Minister for Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs, announced that ‘We (the Government) 
will revoke the passports of those who plan to 
go abroad to join ISIS and those who are already 
abroad with ISIS. They cannot be allowed to come 
home’. (The Jakarta Post, 16 January 2015) In the 
government’s view, allowing foreign fighters to  
return to Indonesia would give them the  
opportunity to influence other Indonesian Muslims 
and inspire them to violent, radical and extremist 
acts in a tragic replay of Indonesia’s experience 
with fighters returning from the conflict in  
Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Many of these 
returnees contributed directly to the rise of violent 
extremism and numerous terrorist acts in  
Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombing.
A range of Muslim organisations have strongly  
supported the government’s position on IS. The 
Indonesian Government applauded a statement 
made by the National Ulama Council (Majelis  
Ulama Indonesia or MUI) in August 2014 that  
ISIL is a violent and radical movement that has 
tarnished the image of peaceful Islam and that 
its movement clearly stands against Islam. In an 
official statement, the Chairman of MUI, Professor 
Din Syamsuddin called upon ‘Islamic organisations 
to step up their vigilance and to guard against 
ISIL efforts to use them’. (Perdani, 8 August 2014) 
The MUI demanded that the government ban 
ISIS ideology to prevent its influencing Indonesian 
Muslims. The Ulama Council also declared the 
ISIS radical campaign to create an Islamic ummah 
as counter to Pancasila and, thus, a threat to the 
unity of the Republic. As in other areas of public 
policy (such as blasphemy) there is little separation 
between MUI and Government policy.
The two largest Muslim-based civil society  
organisations - Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul 
Ulama – issued similar characterizations of the 
Abu Bakar Baasyir, the 
former leader of  
Jemaah Islamiyah who 
is currently in prison  
for involvement in the 
Bali Bombings, has  
declared his allegiance 
to ISIS.
Asian Conflicts Reports  - august 2015 edit ion
19
A PUBLICATION BY THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP)
threat from Islamic State ideology. Kyai Hasyim 
Muzadi, former Chairman of the Nahdhatul Ulama, 
the largest Muslim Based Organisation (MBO),  
condemned ISIL as un-Islamic and warned  
Indonesian Muslims against its promotion of  
violence, adding that its campaign to promote  
Islam was not appropriate to the situation in  
Indonesia. He said ‘ISIS is a new phenomenon in 
the Middle East, which is by no means appropriate 
to Indonesian conditions’. (The Jakarta Post,  
4 August 2014) He then warned the government 
that the infiltration of radical ideology has been 
made easier since the reform era with the 
establishment of various new Muslim  
organisations.
Political Reform and the anti-Islamic State 
Consensus
This general consensus between Government, 
Muslim public opinion, and the major Muslim  
organisations regarding the influence of Islamic 
State marks a major departure from Indonesia’s 
earlier responses to extremism. This may, in part,  
be the result of Indonesian political reforms in  
recent years. Radical 
groups such as Laskar 
Jihad, Jamaah Islamiyah, 
Majelis Mujahidin, and 
The Islamic Defenders 
Front (FPI) have been 
effective in gaining wider 
support under Indonesia’s 
democratisation. These 
groups are often  
reported as endorsing 
violent means of 
protecting and 
promoting Islam. However, as conservative Islamic 
political parties have become an influential voice in 
Indonesian politics, those radical groups operating 
outside the system seem to have less currency. 
The injection of religious agendas into the political 
sphere has undermined support for extremism and, 
therefore, narrowed the space for radical voices.
Indonesia’s anti-Islamic State consensus also reflects 
the particular character of the IS agenda and the 
challenge it poses to existing state structures.  
Indonesian democracy has been strongly coloured 
in recent years by the need to respond to public 
demands for recognition of Indonesia’s Islamic 
identity. This has included political support for 
various legal and regulatory measures (such as 
regional syari’ah regulations and national measures 
such as an anti-pornography law) and an obvious 
flourishing in public piety including growth in 
the prevalence of Muslim attire and Islamic print 
media. Some elements of Indonesian civil society 
have expressed concern over what they see as an 
increasing Islamic conservatism in public policy and 
growing influence of an alliance of conservative 
and radical organisations. While the Government 
has always maintained vigilance against the threat 
of Islamic terrorism, inspired at least in part by a 
historical fear of secessionist threats, the threat 
represented by IS clearly marks a development  
beyond any previous experiences with radicalism 
and extremism. It seems, also, to be forging an  
unprecedented consensus among the diverse  
players in the Indonesian political landscape.
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